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A Tentative Analysis of TPS in the U.S.
Takeo Iida
This paper deals with a tentative analysis of TPS (Toyota Production System) in the U.S.A. Based on the
difference in management styles of Japan and the U.S., there are many advocates who stress cultural barriers
of U.S.-based Japanese subsidiaries, which hinder management effectiveness of their organizations
accordingly. However, this paper reveals that TPS operates well in the U.S. Toyota factories, transcending
cultural differences. Some existing theories of cross-national organization may be needed to be reconsidered
on the basis of how TPS is implemented in the U.S.
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Introduction
Nearly three decades ago, Toyota manufacturing
corporation established TPS (Toyota Production
System) to enhance productivity, and since then TPS
has been adopted as an essential process at Toyota,
affiliated companies, and contractors in Japan and
overseas. In fact, it may be said that TPS has been
replaced with Fordism in the car industry in terms of
efficiency and effectiveness.
This paper addresses performance of TPS in
Toyota’s U.S. - based factories, with special reference
to immunity from cultural differences. The elements
of TPS operation, which are predicated on Japanese
management systems and practices is worthy of
recognit ion in i ts  abil i ty to overcome the
administrative engineering barriers in overseas
production, thereby transcending cultural differences
in the managerial climate between Japan and the U.S.
Existing theories of cross-national organization put
forward by Anbo (1991), Hayashi (1994), and Nonaka
& Takeuchi (1995) should be reexamined in terms of
TPS, which operates well in this respect.
Is TPS Japanese Management?
In the 1980s, Japanese management systems and
practices were a key focus of academics during era
referred to as the Japanese management boom. Many
foreign companies were interested in introducing
Japanese management style into their companies and
production efficiency.
In the beginning of the 1990s, when Japan’s bubble
economy burst, proponents of Japanese management
lost interest in researching Japanese corporations.
Research into the efficiency and effectiveness of
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Japanese management was almost ignored, as the
Japanese economy languished, and it was widely
believed that Japanese management was so
incongruent with foreign managerial climates that it
could not be readily applied to overseas organizations.
Nevertheless, Toyota expanded the number of
overseas factories in spite of Japan’s recession in the
aftermath of the post-bubble economy, and
successfully transplanted TPS in these factories in
cautious and methodical ways. (See, Chart 1)
In one case, TPS was tentatively introduced in
NUMMI, a car manufacturing joint-venture between
Toyota and GM in 1986. This system successfully
operates today. These cases show TPS transcends
cultural differences in the pursuit of production
efficiency.
Chart 1
Four Pillars of TPS
TPS consists of four unique production elements
of Toyota manufacturing company. Each element was
historically and independently developed within the
company, but closely relates to other ones now. They
are indispensible pillars for the company to maintain
a competitive advantage in the car industry worldwide.
1. Kaizen
The Japanese concept of Kaizen can be defined as
constant and indefinite pursuit of Toyota operations,
and relates to safety, operation efficiency and morale.
Kaizen mainly consist of two facets with reference to
production processes: 5S and 5W. Shifting, Sustaining,
Sorting, Shining and Standardizing, and Elimination
of 5 Wastes (Waste of Overproduction, Waste of
Waiting, Waste of Carrying Time, Waste of Processing
and Waste of Inventory).
Workers at the shop level are trained and
disciplined through these two strands of Kaizen as a
sort of action learning since Kaizen is carried out based
on OJT. Though Kaizen requires a time consuming
learning process, it must be observed and acquired
through the process of production.
2. Built-in Quality
Built-in Quality may be defined as power by any
worker to voluntarily stop the moving assembly line.
It is also called the Andon system. Such foolproof
devices were invented on the basis of accumulated
knowledge acquired by workers and supervisors on
the shop floor and are applied to the assembly line in
order to uncover faulty processes or defective parts.
Workers are required to abide by principles of
emergency line stoppage, following on the spot
suggestions from their supervisors.
In contrast to TPS, the Ford production system
demands that inspectors independently check cars after
they are assembled. Under Ford’s production system,
if defection is found, workers in charge are usually
required to work on the assembly line without stopping
it. Toyota’s process-based detection and orientation
system differs markedly from Ford production method.
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3. JIT
Among researchers who have expounded on JIT
(Just In Time), J.K. Liker succinctly depicts this
production system as follows: JIT is a set of principles,
tools, and techniques that allows a company to produce
and deliver products in small quantities, with short
lead times to meet specific customer needs. Simply
put, JIT delivers the right items at the right time in the
right amounts. (1)  JIT takes the form of a supply chain
management that has been uniquely developed within
Toyota based on long-term logistical experience, and
is prevalent in the logistical networks between Toyota,
affiliated companies and sub-contracted companies in
the U.S.
4. Integrated Production System (2)
Integrated production system is an opposite
concept to modular production system in which
contractors usually make parts without frequently
exchanging opinions or views on designs and other
specifications before production is started. In other
words, in modular production, a car assembler leaves
production to contractors in a unilateral or procedural
way.
In contrast to companies using modular production,
Toyota interacts with contractors regarding
specifications by sending their engineers to explore
better elements of processes. Hands-on consultations
with engineers of contracted companies enhance
quality and reduce costs. Toyota rigorously abides by
this system.
Managerial Tactics for Implementing TPS
in the U.S. (3)
It is evident how MTP differs from Fordism in car
production, particularly not only in production
methods, but also in the socio-economic structure
between the two countries. Many nagging problems
come to the fore when TPS is introduced in U.S.
factories. So, management of Toyota has developed
many tactics into seven strands mentioned below:
1. Location of Factories
Whenever Toyota builds a factory abroad,
particularly, in the U.S., the company chooses what is
referred to as “green field investment”, which means
that a factory is built in a vacant lot, instead of
purchasing an existing factory where it is assumed
that most workers belong to labor unions.
Moreover, Toyota methodically selects sites that
are far away from traditional industrial zones or
metropolitan areas. To date, Toyota has built assembly
factories in the rural American Mid West which tends
to be politically conservative and less susceptible to
the strong influence of labor unions.
In addition, the unemployment rate in these regions
tends to be relatively higher, compared with those in
the other metropolitan regions. In such an economic
climate, Toyota can take advantage of lower income
wages, but once local residents get recruited by
Toyota, they get paid well and enjoy better working
conditions in comparison with those in other regions.
2. Methods of Recruiting
Toyota usually tends to single out successful
applicants who have never worked in the car industry.
It seems to the company that working experience in
the car industry may limit workers from understanding
MTP because management finds it difficult for them
to relinquish past knowledge acquired from former
car factories.
It usually takes Toyota six months to accept
employment of applicants for regular workers in the
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U.S., whereas most regular workers in Japan consist
of graduates of educational institutions established by
Toyota. Thus, this is a very cautious and time-
consuming method of recruiting, compared with short-
term recruiting methods with in terms of preference
for job experience, as it is considered vital in Toyota
that cooperation skills and loyalty to the company exist
in candidates for employment.
3. MTP
In the United States, Toyota introduces MTP
(Management Training Program) which provides a
unique training system for new trainees with no
working experience in the car industry. The most
distinctive feature is to use a model that resembles
the real assemble line on which the trainees build a
model, using specific materials.
Toyota expects workers to stay at the factories until
they reach retirement. Particularly, well-motivated
workers are recommended to go to main factories in
Japan to further develop their skills for TPS. When
they return from Japan, they are often promoted to
group leader positions.
4. Community Oriented
As mentioned earlier, Toyota makes strenuous
efforts to unify and assimilate itself to localities. Most
Toyota factories in the U.S. are built in rural areas.
Factory neighborhoods tend to be rustic, and most local
people know one another. Therefore, these employees
are generally cohesive and conservative. The same
uniform with the logo and name of Toyota is provided
for each employee. Even people in the higher echelon
of management are obliged to wear the uniform at the
office.
Every employee uses the same canteens within the
factory irrespective of position, in contrast to separate
or partitioned-off canteens are common according to
hierarchy in many of the U.S. factories. An egalitarian
atmosphere therefore pervades the culture of work.
Toyota contributes to local communities through
donation activities, factory field days for employees’
families, and positive participation of local Lions Clubs.
5. Training and Culture
It is surprising to know that Toyota management
in the U.S. indoctrinates new entrants through teaching
the history of Toyota. Japanese companies that
advance in the U.S. rarely indoctrinate new employees
in this manner. The reason is that management expects
workers to get motivated by learning the historical
facts that Toyota was once on the verge of insolvency
in the mid-1950s when labor strikes were rampant in
Japanese industries.
The rudimentary idea underlying the training
course is that workers should be cooperative with
management beyond differences in interests. This is
why the organizational influence of combatant labor
unions can hardly be observed in Toyota U.S. -based
factories.
6. Long Term Relationship
Toyota seeks to respect long-term relationships
with workers in the U.S where the mid-career
recruiting system is entrenched. In particular, Toyota
still respects the idea of lifetime employment, which
is often construed as obsolete in global industries. It
is believed in Toyota that respect for human resources
can be well-maintained through the life time
employment system, and accordingly competitive
knowledge of operations can be efficiently preserved
and accumulated. This covers not only direct
employees, but also its labor unions, contractors, car
dealers, and even consumers.
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This philosophy can be consistently applied to
overseas subsidiaries and factories. Toyota considers
that overseas management strategy will not work well
unless this relationship is well-organized. Building
“teams”, which is suggestive of cooperation, is a top
priority in Toyota. For that reason, management
concern with human resources takes precedence over
the interests of shareholders in Toyota.
7. Localized Autonomy
In operating factories in the U.S., promotion
incentives are used to strengthen organizational
autonomy and motivate local employees. Similarly,
this is an important management policy effort to reduce
turnover, especially to motivate promising workers
with business acumen. In these ways, Toyota provides
more opportunities for local employees to manage and
supervise factories while facilitating sending Japanese
nationals back to Japan. Compared to the past decades,
higher positions are increasingly occupied by locals
in proportion to Japanese nationals.
Growing Confidence
Toyota began setting up assembly factories
overseas in 1956. However, the first factory was
designed on the basis of the knock down (K.D.
production) system. The 1970s saw that many leading
Japanese companies advanced in highly industrialized
countries such as the United States, West Germany,
and England due largely to trade friction and an
overvalued Japanese yen, but Toyota was reluctant to
invest overseas with 100% equity capitalization
because management was too cautious to advance
abroad. Toyota eventually affiliated itself with General
Motors in 1986 on the basis of joint-venture.
In 2007, overseas factories total 52. The number
of factories with 100% capitalization of stock is 17.
The rest are in the form of joint venture. By 2010,
Toyota plans to set up more factories in China and
India which are expected to be good prospects, given
high economic growth of these two countries.
In 2007, Toyota exceeded 100 billion U.S. dollars
in earnings, overtaking GM in total annual sales. Net
profit approximately exceeds 10 billion dollars. Over
the past decade, Toyota has invested more than 10
billion dollars in R&D to make cars more competitive
and to streamline factory operations. Toyota constantly
challenges many technological barriers and cultural
differences with respect to overseas production. It is
believed that Toyota is becoming a globally
unchallenged car maker because of these efforts.
Theoretical Implications
Theoretical implications are divided into three parts
with special reference to the fact that MTP is doing
well amid the U.S. managerial climate. The first two
issues are concerned with cross-cultural management.
The third one deals with knowledge-based
management which enables workers to motivate
themselves to work.
1. Cross Cultural Interface Management
According to Hayashi (1994), there is a third
organizational climate in the overseas Japanese
subsidiaries. (4) (See, Chart 2) The third organizational
climate is a hybrid overlapping two culturally different
organizations. This atmosphere cannot be found in the
headquarters of the parent country nor in any other
locations of the host country. This management
phenomenon is called “ Intercultural Interface”.
Intercultural Interface is mainly created, shaped,
and constituted by attitudes and managerial character
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of both nations. It is inferred that Intercultural Interface
should be established in terms of efficient operations.
In the case of TPS, however, whether or not
implementation of Intercultural Interface in the U.S.
can be clearly noticed has not yet been settled in that
TPS works well in the overseas managerial climate.
There is no simple way to carry out TPS. It may be
that intercultural interface is invalidated in the arena
of TPS. Further empirical investigation must be made
to see if Intercultural Interface can be applied to TPS
in U.S.-based Toyota factories.
Chart 2
2. Conflict in Application and Adaptation
According to Anbo (1991), there is a clear cut
distinction between organizational conflicts between
application and adaptation of management systems
and practices in Japanese U.S. -based subsidiaries.
(See, Chart 3)(5)
The first conflict relating to application may occur
when Japanese management systems and practices are
introduced in the U.S. managerial climate. The second
conflict concerning adaptation may occur when the
applied practices are in the processes of being
assimilated in overseas subsidiaries or factories. It is
hypothesized that these two conflicts are inevitable in
Japanese subsidiaries. It is also supposed that these
conflicts curb organizational effectiveness, causing
barriers or trouble in the company.
However, TPS is so deeply rooted in the U.S.
managerial climate that the problems relating to
application and adaptation of Japanese management
and practices in the U.S. management arena cannot
be observed. It may be assumed that this management
problem is not applicable to TPS.
Chart 3
3. Reconsideration of SECI Model
The SECI model was explored and formulated by
Nonaka and Takeuchi in the 1980s. (See, Chart 4) The
SECI model is based on the two main concepts of
explicit knowledge and implicit knowledge.(6)  These
two concepts are introduced in the theories of
management or business communications.
The SECI model may be used to illustrate the
efficiency and effectiveness of a manufacturing
division in terms of the integrated production system
that seems to be characteristic of Japanese industry.
However, this model remains to be seen in terms of
the empirical aspect of organizational operations.(7)
Does Intercultural Interface Exist in MTP? Application and Adaptation of Japanese
Management into Foreign Managerial Climates
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Two issues can be posed for further discussion to
scrutinize the SECI model.
The first issue is that the SECI model is not
predicated on the idea of time sequence. Time
sequence has not been considered in the model at all.
According to the theorem put forward by Nonaka,
individual units of knowledge in the four quadrants
can be mechanically circulated with the proper time
sequence in the SECI model.
The second issue is associated with learning
organization with respect to organizational dynamics.
This means that Nonaka et all take organizational
structures for granted. In other words, no substantial
or specific agents in the SECI model were illustrated
as a case study. The interactions and reciprocity
between workers in different positions in the same
organization need to be considered in terms of
authority, hostility, cooperation, etc. In doing so, the
theoretical foundation of the SECI model will be
reinforced if applied to TPS for probing its outstanding
production capability amid cultural differences.
Conclusion
It may be concluded that from the evidence of
quality. efficiency, and employee satisfaction, TPS in
the U.S. operates well and transcends cultural
differences between Japan and the U.S. No serious
labor and administrative engineering problems have
been created with reference to TPS. TPS is an
important factor for generating a competitive
advantage for Toyota in the car industry. It may be
recommended, however, that the theoretical
framework for cross-national management differences
should be modified. Particularly, the existing dominant
hypothesis put forth by Hayashi, Monden, and Nonaka
should be reexamined, based on empirical
investigation of the implementation of TPS in the U.S.
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TPS and SECI MODEL
Four Transformation Modes of Knowledge
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